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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JESSE E. SMITH and BETH M. SMITH : 
: Case No. 900277-CA 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : 
v. : Argument Priority 
: Classification: 14-b 
SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN ANDERSON, : 
and CHARLES L. APPLEBY, JR., : 
Defendants-Respondents. : 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is properly 
founded by Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from a judgment entered by the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Senior Judge, sitting in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court in Washington County, where Appellants 
sought specific performance of an alleged right of first refusal 
pertaining to real property. The trial judge, however, upheld 
Salli Smith West's sale of the property, vesting title in Respon-
dents Ken Anderson and Charles L. Appleby. 
As a passing note, this Court should be aware that 
Appellants1 title page reflecting that the trial court sat in Iron 
County is obviously a typographical error. The Court should 
further note that the Plaintiff Genevieve A. Smith apparently has 
not appealed the trial court's decision, and that Respondents1 
counsel represents only Respondents Ken Anderson and Charles L. 
Appleby, Jr. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondents believe that the following issues constitute 
the appropriate scope of judicial review in the instant case: 
I. Appropriate standards of appellate review compel the 
affirmation of the trial court's judgment. 
II. Appellants have not met the high evidentiary standard 
required to support a decree for specific performance. 
III. The statute of frauds as to Jesse Smith's claim has been 
satisfied in the instant case. 
IV. The Decree of Final Distribution and deed issued concur-
rent thereto in the probate of Elias Penn Smith's estate 
merged any claimed right of first refusal. 
V. The doctrines of promissory and equitable estoppel bar 
Jesse Smith's assertion of any right of first refusal. 
VI. Jesse Smith lacks the requisite "clean hands" to assert 
his right of first refusal. 
VII. The statute of frauds, a lack of mutuality, and the 
failure of Beth Smith to testify preclude her from 
asserting any claim. 
VIII. Though not an Appellant, Genevieve Smith lacked standing 
to assert any first right of refusal before the trial 
court. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Where necessary, Respondents shall cite to appropriate 
constitutional and statutory provisions within the body of the 
brief and shall quote the same, unless otherwise noted, in their 
entirety. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants Jesse and Beth Smith, together with their 
stepmother Genevieve Smith, brought an action for specific 
performance alleging their desire to exercise a "first right of 
refusal" pertaining to land situate in Washington County. As 
specific performance is an equitable remedy, it required these 
parties to come before the trial court with a clear right, with 
clean hands, and to bear a high burden of proof to prevail. The 
Honorable Dean E. Conder sat as trial court judge and duly noted 
early on in the record that the issues would ultimately be decided 
based on the credibility of the witnesses. [Transcript (herein-
after T) at 22] Indeed, throughout the trial, Judge Conder 
repeatedly inquired from the bench as to the veracity of both Jesse 
Smith's and Salli Smith West's testimony regarding a September, 
1986, phone call, the substance of which was widely contested by 
the parties. Ultimately, Judge Conder requested permission of 
counsel to examine en camera one of the versions of the testimony. 
[See T at 22, 34, 41-43, 73, 74, and 88-90. The en camera phone 
call is reported at T 144-145; cf. testimony of Jesse Smith at 41-
42, testimony of Salli Smith West at 72-74.] 
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The trial court's examination of the witnesses1 credibil-
ity was focused primarily on two sibling heirs of Elias Penn Smith, 
who passed away February 1, 1976, leaving a wife, Genevieve A. 
Smith, and three children by a prior marriage, Jesse Smith, Penn 
Harris Smith, and Salli Smith West. The estate of Elias Penn Smith 
was probated as Washington County Civil No. 2070. The Plaintiffs 
Genevieve A. Smith and Jesse E. Smith, together with the Defendant 
Salli Smith West, then known as Salli Smith Girard, executed a 
Stipulation and Petition for Distribution on February 7, 1977, 
received as P-l. [Appendix 1] It did not bear the signature of 
Appellant Beth Smith. Specifically, paragraphs five and eight 
thereof, concerning the subject property, called for the distribu-
tion of the same with an attendant right of first refusal to 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Salli Smith West as tenants 
in common. These paragraphs read as follows: 
5. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot 
Springs, the description of which is in the 
Inventory and Appraisement, should be distri-
buted to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, 
and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in common. 
8. The parties who take the property set 
forth above as tenants in common hereby agree 
to grant their fellow tenants a right of first 
refusal to buy their interest in said property 
in the event that tenant wishes to sell. That 
tenant shall advise the co-tenant of his 
desire to sell, and if a bona-fide offer is 
received from a third party, that offer must 
be met or the tenant may sell to said third 
party or any other third party. If the tenant 
desires to exercise the first right of refusal 
and a third offer is unavailable, then the 
interest shall be determined by an evaluation 
of the fair market value of said property and 
4 
can be" accompanied by the appointment of an 
appraiser by said tenants. Each tenant shall 
appoint an appraiser and if the tenants are 
still in disagreement, those appraisers shall 
appoint another appraiser and the decision of 
that appraiser shall be final. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Respondents introduced, however, the subsequent Decree of 
Final Distribution in the matter of the Estate of Elias Penn Smith 
as Defendants' Exhibit No. D-8. [Appendix 2] Executed by J. 
Harlan Burns on July 23, 1977, the decree contained no language in 
reference to a right of first refusal, and in paragraph 4.b. 
thereof states simply as follows: 
4.b. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot 
Springs and set forth in Exhibit lfBfl attached 
hereto is distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, 
Jesse E. Smith and Salli Smith Girard, each 
having a one-third interest, as tenants in 
common. 
There were no reservations in the title. Exhibit B to 
D-8, also separately marked, identified, and received as 
Defendants1 Exhibit No. D-9, a quit claim deed, further shows that, 
while both Genevieve Smith and Salli Smith West received their one-
third of the property, the remaining one-third vested not only in 
Jesse E. Smith, but in his wife Beth M. Smith as well. The latter 
couple held their third interest inter se as joint tenants. 
[Appendix 3] Simply stated, neither the Decree of Final Distribu-
tion nor the final deed corresponds to the petition for distribu-
tion filed with the probate court seven months earlier in February 
of 1977. There is no reservation of a first right of refusal in 
the quit claim deed, and, indeed, there is no restatement of the 
same whatsoever in the Decree of Final Distribution. Though no 
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testimony explains why these documents varied from the antecedent 
petition, it is clear that Appellants never appealed the same on 
the basis of fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. [T at 115, 128] 
These four tenants held the property through 1986, when 
Salli Smith West first entertained several discussions with 
Respondents Anderson and Appleby in reference to their purchasing 
her one-third interest in the property. Salli Smith West testified 
that, while she was aware that she had executed a first right of 
refusal, she did not feel it legally binding, but rather extended 
that right to her other co-tenants as a matter of family courtesy. 
[T at 64,77] 
Though there was a dispute in the testimony as to how 
Salli communicated Anderson and Appleby's offer to her relatives, 
the trial court clearly found that Salli's testimony was authorita-
tive, accurate, and credible over that of her brother, Appellant 
Jesse Smith. Sallifs phone records indicate that on September 26, 
1986, at 12:42 p.m., she telephoned her brother in Las Vegas, 
Nevada, at his place of employment and indicated that she had 
received an offer for $125,000 for her one-third interest in the 
property. [T 63-64, 73, 77] Salli explained to Jesse the terms of 
the agreement, and at that time Jesse Smith indicated to Salli that 
she should go ahead and sell the property, and that he would 
provide her with a release and waiver of any first right of refusal 
that may otherwise exist in himself, as well as his stepmother 
Genevieve Smith and his wife Beth Smith. [Id.] Jesse subsequently 
drafted and signed a letter dated September 29, 1986, which Salli 
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Smith West received on October 2, 1986• [P 4; see Appendix 4] 
Paragraph two of that letter explicitly memorializes the earlier 
verbal statement made by Jesse Smith to his sister Salli Smith 
West. That statement is as follows: 
What I will need from you is a copy of their 
offer to buy, properly signed by them, and 
noterized [sic]. Also, a copy of the sales 
agreement. I will give you a letter signed by 
Beth, Gen, And [sic] myself releasing you from 
our option of first right of refusal. 
At trial, Jesse Smith testified that he never intended to 
comply with the language of the letter, but, rather, wrote it 
simply as a ploy to flesh out the terms of the offer from Anderson 
and Appleby. [T 44-45, 99, 102-103] Indeed, in filing this suit, 
he acted totally contrary to the clear language thereof. 
The trial court found that Salli Smith West complied with 
the terms of Jesse Smith's letter by supplying him sufficient 
information and documents regarding the offer. This information 
was provided by Salli's letter of October 6, 1986, P-5, which 
enclosed P-7 (the closing document). [T 36, 38] The trial court 
further found that the Defendant Salli Smith West had detrimentally 
relied on both the oral conversation of September 26, 1986, and the 
letter in completing the sale to Respondents Anderson and Appleby, 
and that, further, Anderson and Appleby had detrimentally relied on 
the letter insofar as they had been aware of some first right of 
refusal, but were subsequently assured by Salli Smith West that the 
same had been taken care of or waived. [See Appendices 5 and 6.] 
Despite the clear language of his letter, Jesse Smith, 
joined Appellant Beth Smith and stepmother Genevieve Smith in 
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filing an unverified complaint on October 17, 1986, seeking to set 
aside the sale to Anderson and Appleby and specific performance of 
their alleged first right of refusal. [R 1] Paragraph three of 
that complaint states that, pursuant to the joint ownership of the 
property, each had extended to the other a "right of first 
refusal." In an affidavit filed with the trial court on January 
22, 1988, Jesse Smith further states, in paragraph four thereof, 
that Genevieve Smith "his mother [sic] is also a co-owner with the 
same right of first refusal." 
Beth M. Smith never testified at trial. On cross-
examination, Genevieve Smith conceded that she had conveyed all of 
her interest in the subject property to a corporation; this having 
occurred in May of 1988. [T 111-112] Judge Conder, in his initial 
Memorandum Decision, noted that, as Genevieve Smith had conveyed 
her property to a corporation, she no longer had standing as a co-
tenant to assert any right of first refusal. [Appendix 5] 
Furthermore, Judge Condor found Beth Smith to have never had a 
right of first refusal, as she was never a signatory to the 
original February, 1977, stipulation. [P 1] Paragraphs two and 
three of the Memorandum Decision are set forth in verbatum as 
follows: 
2. Genevieve Smith created a Nevada 
corporation and transferred her interest in 
the Pah Tempe property to this corporation. 
She did not feel that she had to offer the 
property to anyone else because it was "her 
corporation" and that the first refusal did 
not apply. Whether or not it applied becomes 
immaterial at this point because she is no 
longer a co-tenant and has no right to claim 
the benefit of such a right. The courts have 
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long distinguished between the individual and 
a corporation. The fact that she may be the 
sole stockholder does not alter the fact that 
she is no longer a co-tenant. The court must 
hold against her on her claim. 
3. Beth M. Smith is not a party to the 
stipulation and cannot claim any rights under 
it. 
With regard to the remaining Appellant Jesse Smithfs 
claim, the following pertinent provisions from paragraph one of the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision are telling: 
This court determines that Salli Smith 
gave sufficient notice to the defendant, Jesse 
Smith, on September 26, 1986, by a verbal 
notice of the offer of Appleby and Anderson. 
Mr. Smith said he had no desire to meet the 
offer. He further assured West that he would 
send her a letter to that effect. On Septem-
ber 29, 1986, he sent a letter to West saying, 
"I will give you a letter signed by Beth, Gen, 
and myself releasing you from our option of 
first right of refusal.11 He did not send that 
letter. In fact, he then stalled by asking 
for documents that seem irrelevant to the 
"right". I find that Mr. Smith, agreed to the 
sale by West in the telephone conversation on 
September 26, 1986, and that he gave up any 
claim he had under his Right of First Refusal 
at that time. Further more, I find that by 
his representation in the phone conversation 
and also by the letter, he is estopped from 
asserting the claim. Mrs. West, in reliance 
upon his representations, consummated her sale 
and put herself in a position of jeopardy by 
his conduct. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
The standard of review under Utah law provides that a 
trial court's findings shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. In light of this standard and the exclusive prerogative 
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of the trial court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses, it 
becomes incumbent upon this Court to note the various contradic-
tions in Jesse Smith's testimony, particularly when compared to 
that of his sister Salli Smith West. A plethora of evidence 
supports the trial court's ruling. 
II. 
Appellants have failed to sustain a high evidentiary 
standard to justify a decree of specific performance in equity. 
III. 
Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code was satisfied by Exhibit 
P-4, a letter drafted and signed as a matter of law by Jesse Smith. 
This letter is not precatory in nature, and is fully integrated to 
the subject property. The signature requirement of the statute of 
frauds is satisfied by the typed signature of Jesse Smith when the 
letter was concededly drafted, signed, and mailed by him to his 
sister Salli Smith West. 
IV. 
Any alleged right of first refusal was extinguished and 
merged in the Decree of Final Distribution and deed issuing from 
the estate of Elias Penn Smith. The merger doctrine operated to 
eliminate any agreements not collateral to the taking of title or 
to encumbrances regarding the property. Nothing could be less 
collateral than a right of first refusal. Insofar as the Decree of 
Distribution and the deed fail to mention any such right, the same 
is extinguished as a matter of law and cannot be reasserted absent 
an attack on the probate proceedings bottomed in fraud. 
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V. 
Jesse Smith is barred from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense or, for that matter, from asserting any defense 
by the doctrines of both promissory and equitable estoppel. The 
trial court found that Jesse Smith had, both orally and in writing, 
advised his sister, Salli Smith West, to proceed with the sale of 
the property to Respondents. The trial court further found that 
Salli had reasonably relied on the statements of her brother to her 
detriment. The doctrines of estoppel, as set forth in J.P. Koch, 
Inc. v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975), are clearly 
applicable in the instant case. 
VI. 
Jesse Smith lacks the requisite clean hands to assert any 
equitable rights before the trial court. Jesse came before the 
court concededly admitting that he drafted and signed Exhibit P-4 
absent any intent to comply with its terms. Indeed, Jesse conceded 
on cross examination that his interaction with his sister was 
merely an artifice to get her to perform certain acts and that he 
did not intend to act in accordance with either his oral or written 
representations. As equity demands fair and equitable conduct in 
those seeking it, Jesse Smith's request for equity must be denied. 
VII. 
Beth Smith's claim is barred by the statute of frauds, a 
lack of mutuality, and her failure to provide the trial court with 
any testimony. As Beth Smith was not a party to the stipulation, 
there is no covenant running to her, nor can she benefit from her 
11 
husband's testimony. Further, as Beth Smith failed to testify, the 
Intermediate Court of Appeals has previously held that she cannot 
reassert her claim on appeal or somehow require a remand to now 
assert a claim which, by her actions, has been conclusively waived 
at trial. 
VIII. 
Thought not an appellant, Genevieve Smith lacks standing 
to assert any first right of refusal before the trial court. 
Approximately one year prior to trial, Genevieve conveyed her one-
third interest, without notice to her co-tenants, to a Nevada 
corporation. As rights of first refusal are freely assignable, and 
her deed contained no reservations, she no longer is a proper party 
in interest to assert that claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW COMPEL 
THE AFFIRMATION OF THE TRIAL COURT«S JUDGMENT. 
Prior to July 1, 1985, the Utah Constitution, art. VIII, 
§ 9, specifically set forth a greater standard of review in equit-
able cases. [See e.g., Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); 
Bown v. Loveland. 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984).] Under this standard, 
the appellate court cannot reverse the trial court judgment unless 
the evidence in the case clearly preponderated against its 
findings. In Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494 (Utah 1986), however, 
Justice Durham, speaking for a unanimous Utah Supreme Court, noted 
that even though the former constitutional section had been 
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redrafted, Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., which became effective January 1, 
1987, provided that findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous." [Id. at 496, n. 3] This standard applied 
regardless of whether the case is one in equity or one in law. 
[See Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548 (Utah App. 1987); see also, 
Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987).] Most recently, in Judd 
Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 
Justice Howe stated the applicable standard as follows: 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
forbids us from setting aside factual findings 
unless clearly erroneous, giving due regard to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses. We find 
nothing in the trial court's findings of fact 
which would suggest that they are erroneous, 
let alone "clearly erroneous." In Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), we 
stated that we would not overturn a finding of 
fact without first marshaling all the evidence 
supporting the finding and then demonstrating 
that when viewed in the light most favorable 
to the trial court, the evidence is clearly 
insufficient to support that finding. 
[Id. at 9] 
The second portion of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. indicates that 
due regard "shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." As before stated, in this 
case, the trial court was required to judge the credibility of 
witnesses. The trial court was able to view both the Appellant 
Jesse Smith and Respondents' grantor Salli Smith West. Having 
heard their testimonies and, indeed, having, with permission of 
counsel, made certain en camera inquiries relative to the earlier 
testimony of Jesse Smith, the trial court was uniquely positioned 
to determine the veracity of their testimonies. As shall be set 
forth more succinctly in Point VI hereafter, the trial court found 
the credibility of Jesse Smith lacking in the instant case, and 
Judge Condor's findings are well supported by his belief in the 
testimony of Salli Smith West. Appropriate appellate standards 
mandate that those findings be sustained on appeal. 
II. 
APPELLANTS HAVE NOT MET THE HIGH EVIDENTIARY 
STANDARD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT A DECREE FOR 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
Appellants below sought specific performance of a claimed 
right of first refusal. The nature of the specific-performance 
remedy required that they meet a high evidentiary standard to 
justify a favorable decree. [See Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 
368, 423 P.2d 491, at 493 (1967).] 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Per-
formance § 208 (1973), states the applicable standard as follows: 
Where an action is brought for specific 
performance, the established rule is that more 
than a mere preponderance of testimony is 
required to establish the existence of the 
contract when its existence is denied. In 
order that specific performance of a contract 
may be decreed, the evidence of the making of 
the contract must be clear and convincing, or 
as stated in some cases, clear, cogent, and 
convincing, or strong and conclusive. 
In the instant case, to establish their claim for 
specific performance, Appellants had to clearly establish at trial 
that the "right of first refusal" had not been waived, merged into 
a subsequent Decree of Final Distribution and deed or that they 
were not estopped from asserting the same or that byth had not 
otherwise transferred or waived their rights, if any. 
In the pleadings before the court, Appellants claimed 
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that as co-tenants they held a right of first refusal. As to Beth 
Smith, this is patently untrue, and, by the time of trial, as to 
Genevieve Smith, it was also untrue. Furthermore, there was no 
mention in the pleadings whatsoever that Appellant Jesse Smith had 
both verbally and in writing promised his sister, Salli Smith West, 
that he would provide her a written waiver of whatever first right 
of refusal Appellants claimed. Jesse's testimony at trial, 
however, was contradictory and failed to establish either the good 
faith or clean hands required of those seeking specific perform-
ance. As a result, the trial court could not rule in favor of the 
equitable remedies Appellants sought. [See e.g. Ferris v. 
Jennings. 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1978).] 
III. 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AS TO JESSE SMITH'S 
CLAIM HAS BEEN SATISFIED IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
While in point one of Appellants1 brief the applicability 
of Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code is discussed at length, 
Respondents believe that Section 25-5-1 is more applicable to the 
instant case. At trial, Appellants sought enforcement of an 
alleged right of first refusal. Defendant Salli Smith West claimed 
that right did not exist as a legal requirement or that, secondar-
ily, if it did exist, at least one of the Plaintiffs had waived the 
same in writing. 
As to Jesse Smith's claim, Section 25-5-1 of the Utah 
Code states as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, 
other than leases for a term not exceeding one 
year, nor any trust or power over or concer-
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ning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance 
in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same. or by his lawful agent thereunto 
authorized by writing. [Emphasis added.] 
The statute of frauds does not require that a signature to the 
memorandum satisfying it be in any particular form or be hand-
written. As stated in 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 358: 
There is no requirement that the sig-
nature to a memorandum required by the statute 
of frauds be in any particular form . . . . 
[it] need not be signed in ink. It may be 
signed by lead pencil. . . . except where the 
statute . . . requiring . . . an "actual 
manual subscription," it is well established 
that it is not essential to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds that the memorandum required 
thereby be signed by the hand of the party to 
be charged. The . . . signature may be af-
fixed by a stamp, or it may be typewritten or 
printed mechanically, if, but only if, by 
signing in any of these methods the party 
whose signature is essential intends to au-
thenticate the instrument as his act. . . . 
The signature may consist of any name or 
symbol used by a party with the intention of 
constituting it his signature. [Citations 
omitted.] 
Genevieve Smith is not an Appellant in the instant case. 
Beth Smith neither acquired, at the outset, any first right of 
refusal nor testified at trial. As to Jesse Smith, however, the 
trial court receiv€>d into evidence Exhibit P-4, a letter which he 
concededly drafted and mailed to his sister, Salli Smith West. 
Paragraph two of that letter states as follows: 
What I will need from you is a copy of their 
offer to buy properly signed by them and 
noterized [sic]. Also a copy of the sales 
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agreement. I will give you a letter signed by 
Beth, Gen, And fsic] myself releasing you from 
our option of first right of refusal, 
[Appendix 4] [Emphasis added.] 
The trial court found that Exhibit P-4 memorialized 
Jesse's oral representations made to his sister Salli Smith West. 
Not precatory in nature, Jesse Smith's letter, which, at the very 
least, binds him, states that he would not claim any first right of 
refusal. Findings of fact 17 through 23 set forth the nature of 
the oral and written representations of the Appellant Jesse Smith 
and Defendant Salli Smith West's appropriate compliance with the 
conditions precedent to Jesse's oral and written agreement to 
release his "first right of refusal." [See also, T. at 69, 73-76, 
88, 95-96, 98, and 104.] 
The recent Idaho case, George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 115 Idaho 386, 766 P.2d 1267 (Idaho App. 1988), held 
that the word "subscribed", similar to that in Utah's statute of 
frauds, meant that the "signature" may be any symbol made or 
"adopted by a party, with an actual or apparent attempt to authen-
ticate the writing and give it force and effect". The Idaho court 
noted that, while the traditional form of a signature is normally 
handwritten, the Idaho statute, similar to Utah's, does not require 
an actual manual subscription, and, for that reason, the signature 
may be written in pencil, typed, printed, or made with a rubber 
stamp or impressed into the paper. [Id., citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 134, comment a (1981).] 
In Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 773 (Utah 1967), 
Chief Justice Crockett defined the word "signature" as follows: 
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In regard to a signature, it is the intent 
rather than the form of the act that is impor-
tant. While one's signature is usually made 
by writing his name, the same purpose can be 
accomplished by placing any writing, indicia 
or symbol which the signor chooses to adopt 
and use as his signature and by which it may 
be proved: e.g., by finger or thumb prints, by 
a cross or other mark, or by any type of 
mechanically reproduced or stamped facsimile 
of his signature, as effectively as by his own 
handwriting. [Id. at 774] 
In the instant case, Jesse Smith introduced P-4 as his letter and, 
further, testified that he had mailed it to the Defendant Salli 
Smith West. Indeed, both of the parties accepted P-4 as authentic, 
and there was no issue as to it having been dated, typed and mailed 
by Jesse Smith. [T 44-45] Clearly, Salli Smith West also regarded 
the letter as genuine and relied on the same to her detriment, 
though she was subsequently sued by Jesse Smith and her other "co-
tenants" . [T 75-76, 88-90] 
On cross examination regarding P-4, Jesse Smith's letter 
of September 29, Jesse Smith conceded as follows: 
Q. [BY MR. HUGHES] And in that letter, 
you state, "Send me the documents, and I'll 
give you the release"? 
A. [BY JESSE SMITH] How many times 
have I said "yes" to that? 
Q. BY MR. HUGHES: And did — what I am 
saying is did you state in that letter "Send 
me the documents, but if I don't like the 
terms I discover, I'll refuse to give you a 
release"? 
A. Well, I would guess that would be 
understood. 
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Q." Oh. And where would it be under-
stood from D-4, [sic] that that was your 
intent, Mr. Smith? 
A. It wouldn't, I guess. The way it's 
written. [T 102-103] 
Jesse Smith wrote, dated and subscribed P-4, which satis-
fied the requirements of § 25-5-1 of the Utah Code. P-4 is not 
precatory; it is integrated to Respondents' purchase of the subject 
property. Jesse Smiths' claim before the trial court and on appeal 
that the statute of frauds has not been satisfied must be rejected. 
IV. 
THE DECREE OF FINAL DISTRIBUTION AND DEED 
ISSUED CONCURRENT THERETO IN THE PROBATE 
OF ELIAS PENN SMITH'S ESTATE MERGED ANY 
CLAIMED RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. 
Respondents take issue with the finding of the trial 
court that the right of first refusal, as set forth in the 
Stipulation and Petition for Distribution, was not properly merged 
by the Decree of Final Distribution and deed concluding the probate 
of Elias Penn Smith. These latter documents were collectively 
recorded as Entry No. 185994 in the Records of Washington County on 
August 3, 1977. [See D-8, Exhibit B thereto; Exhibit B being 
separately marked as D-9.] 
The trial court, on the basis of G.G. & A. , Inc. v. 
Leventis. 773 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1989), held that the right of 
first refusal set forth in the Stipulation and Petition for 
Distribution, executed seven months prior thereto and marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, was a collateral agreement surviving the 
Decree of Final Distribution and deed regarding the subject 
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property which issued therefrom. In its Memorandum Decision, the 
trial court stated as follows: 
The Defendants1 contend that any Right of 
First Refusal contained in the stipulation was 
merged into the Decree of Distribution and 
deed. They cite the case of Davis v. Davis, 
(Okla. App., 632 P.2d 769) as their authority 
for the claim. This court finds that case is 
distinguishable. The Utah case of G.G.A., vs 
Leventis, (107 Utah Adv. Rep. 65) is more in 
point. The agreement of First Refusal is 
certainly a collateral agreement to the divi-
sion and distribution of the property in the 
estate. 
Respondents, despite the trial court's ruling, nonethe-
less, must strongly urge on appeal that rights of first refusal are 
not collateral to the title of property and, as such, cannot be 
excepted therefrom by either the unilateral or mutual intent of the 
parties. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a direct 
reservation, if valid, is anything but directly connected to the 
nature and quality of title taken. In making this assertion, 
Respondents refer this Court to the case of Secor v. Knight, 716 
P.2d 790 (Utah 1986). fSee also, Dobruskv v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1987); El Sol Corp. v. Jones, 97 N.M. 645, 642 P.2d 1104 
(1982).] In the Secor case, Justice Durham, speaking for a 
unanimous Utah Supreme Court, stated that Utah has long accepted 
the doctrine of merger. Thereafter, Justice Durham stated the 
general rule of merger as follows: 
[0]n delivery and acceptance of the deed the 
provisions of the underlying contract for the 
conveyance are deemed extinguished or super-
seded by the deed. The basis for imposing the 
doctrine of merger is not due to any peculiar 
sanctity attaching to the deed itself, but 
because it is regarded as the final repository 
of the agreement which led to its execution. 
[Id. at 792] [Citations omitted.] 
Justice Durham then proceeded to distinguish between 
those contractual terms collateral to the agreement to convey 
property, and therefore not merged by deed, and those agreements 
and covenants which related directly to the taking of title and 
encumbrances on the property which, by their nature, cannot be 
considered collateral because they relate to the same subject 
matter as does the deed. Her discussion on page 793 of the Secor 
decision is illuminative: 
For example, in Stubbs v. Hemmert, [567 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1977)] this court found that the 
terms in the underlying contract relating to 
the removal of air compressors from a piece of 
property were collateral to the agreement to 
convey the property and were therefore not 
extinguished by the deed. See also Kelsev v. 
Hansen 18 Utah 2d 226, 419 P.2d 198 (1966) 
(recognizing the existence of cases in equity 
which result in nonmerger, but declining to 
apply nonmerger under the facts of that case). 
In this regard, covenants relating to title 
and encumbrances are not considered to be 
collateral because they relate to the same 
subject matter as does the deed. [id. at 793] 
The Secor decision clearly mandates that terms and 
covenants which directly relate to the title of the property or to 
encumbrances thereon are not collateral, but, as they impinge upon 
the title itself, they are merged into any subsequent deed. 
Clearly, only obligations truly collateral to the title itself 
would survive the deed and not be extinguished by it. Ultimately, 
if the terms relate to the taking of the title itself, or impinge 
on the quality thereof, they cannot be collateral despite any 
contrary intent of the parties. With regard to the defendant's 
contention in the'Secor case, Justice Durham stated the latter rule 
as follows: 
As this case involves terms relating to title, 
which are not collateral, the Knights1 reli-
ance on intent is misplaced. [£d. ] 
The Decree of Final Distribution, and the deed which was 
recorded as a part thereof, conveyed the property in question in 
differing amounts and to differing parties than was contained in 
the Stipulation and Petition for Distribution, [See D 8, D 9, cf. 
PI.] Indeed, Beth Smith suddenly rises to the status of a grantee 
under Exhibit B to D-8 and D-9, and neither document mentions the 
right of first refusal, which would have obviously encumbered the 
nature of the title taken by the various grantees. Salli Smith 
West testified that she offered the property to her family purely 
as a matter of courtesy; otherwise, she did not recognize that 
right. [T 77-79] Once again, regardless of the parties' intent, 
the documents concluding the probate of Elias Penn Smith, recorded 
in Washington County, are conclusive and merge any title reserva-
tions. [D 8 and D 9, D 9 being attached as Exhibit B to D-8] 
As the title was taken free and clear of any alleged 
right of first refusal, that right mentioned in the stipulation is 
thereby extinguished. Simply stated, a right of first refusal is 
not collateral; it impinges directly on the title to real estate. 
Regardless of the intent of the parties, therefore, it is extin-
guished by the Decree of Final of Distribution and deed issuing out 
of the probate court. Once Elias Penn Smith's probate was 
concluded, the Decree of Final Distribution and deed issued thereby 
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V. 
THE DOCTRINES OF PROMISSORY AND EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL BAR JESSE SMITH'S ASSERTION OF 
ANY RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL. 
Appellant Jesse Smith argues that his invocation of the 
statute of frauds is a valid defense. However, the invocation of 
that defense, or, for that matter, any defense, is barred by the 
doctrines of both promissory and equitable estoppel. The first — 
promissory estoppel — arises only upon an express promise to 
execute a writing or to perform an act in the future which is 
relied on by a party to his or her detriment. [See P 4.] 
Equitable estoppel is yet a broader doctrine to preclude or bar one 
party from asserting a claim against another. As stated by Justice 
Crockett, speaking for a unanimous court, in J. P. Koch, Inc. v. 
J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975): 
The invocation of estoppel does not neces-
sarily involve any contract or agreement 
between the parties, consequently, the ele-
ments of a contract are not involved and there 
is no requirement of consideration. It is a 
doctrine of equity to prevent one party from 
deluding or inducing another into a position 
where he will unjustly suffer loss. As ap-
plicable here, the test is whether there is 
conduct, by act or omission, by which one 
party knowingly leads another party, reason-
ably acting thereon, to take some course of 
action, which will result in his detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to 
repudiate or deny his conduct or represen-
tation. [P.2d at 904-905] 
Cases from other jurisdictions setting out fact situations which 
are sufficient to support a claim of estoppel are set out in 37 
C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of, § 246. [See also, Topik v. Thurber, 739 
P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 
1977) ] 
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More complete findings :i n reference to Jesse Smith's behavior, 
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which compel the application of the doctrine of estoppel, are set 
forth at R 242-43. 
The trial court clearly chose to believe the testimony of 
Salli Smith West over that of her brother Jesse E. Smith. Finding 
of fact no, 17 details the purpose of an en camera telephone call 
conducted by the trial court investigating a portion of Jesse 
Smith's testimony. A portion of that finding states as follows: 
The Court finds, based upon the credibility of 
the testimony of Salli Smith, that during this 
telephone conversation Jesse E. Smith further 
assured Salli Smith West that he would send 
her a letter to the effect that he would not 
exercise his first right of refusal. [R 241] 
The Court further found that, three days subsequent to 
that telephone conversation, Jesse sent the letter marked as P-4, 
and that Salli reeisonably relied on both the oral and written 
representations of Jesse in allowing Respondents Anderson and 
Appleby to purchase her interest in the subject matter property. 
[See Findings of Fact No. 19 and 20 at R 242.] The estoppel 
doctrine presently bars any assertion by Jesse Smith that he now be 
allowed to renege on his promise as contained in P-4 and as earlier 
stated telephonically to Salli. Jesse Smith's oral representations 
and his letter were acted upon by Salli Smith West to her detriment 
and, indeed, were relied on by Respondents Anderson and Appleby in 
completing their purchase. 
VI. 
JESSE SMITH LACKS THE REQUISITE "CLEAN HANDS" 
TO ASSERT HIS ALLEGED FIRST RIGHT OF REFUSAL. 
Appellant Jesse Smith requested specific performance of 
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his alleged fi rst right of refusal. Sounding squarely in equity, 
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On cross examination by Respondents' counsel, he conceded that 
Salli Smith West had correctly stated the amount as being $125,000, 
but held firm to the testimony that the phone call occurred at his 
home. [See T 40-43, T 43 at lines 12-15, T 98.] Though Salli 
Smith West's phone records, received into evidence as D-13, 
displayed only one call to the Las Vegas area, where Appellant 
Jesse Smith resided and worked, Jesse Smith was adamant that Salli 
Smith West could not possibly reach him at his work number, 
(702) 295-0029. On cross examination, Jesse Smith indicated the 
number was unfamiliar, and stated that he could not be reached 
whatsoever at that number. [T 40-41] Indeed, he indicated that 
dialing that number, at best, would allow you to leave a message to 
him. [T 42] The trial court also inquired as to the ability of 
Salli Smith West to reach her brother at the number indicated on 
D-3. [Id.] 
During a recess, with the consent of counsel at the 
conclusion of testimony, Judge Conder dialed area code 
(702) 295-0029. He identified himself and requested to talk to Mr. 
Jesse Smith. Someone similar to a Mr. or Mrs. Bassett responded 
that Jesse Smith was not at work that day, that he was at a trial 
in Judge Condor's court. This individual also stated that, were 
Jesse at work, Judcfe Condor would have been able to speak to him. 
[T 144-45] Finding of fact no. 17 memorializes the trial court's 
conclusion by reason of this inquiry. [R 241] 
Mistaken testimony is commonplace and, standing alone, 
does not rise to the level of unclean hands. Respondent Jesse 
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i •; .l u r t f - t * g^n-.. 
1 1ephone o n v e r s a t 
-• - * i 
10 r . o s i n q St*-.r 
i otiDtemt-e: 
- ~ i — i t>* » ! < : * 
" • t o r ^f S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 
11 * * f i ' . •• *? ' '« • * • .* i * * ^ 
-quest od i c:ip) : * : •. 
i Ar:p . obv . and a copy 
: * - * i esponsi ve 
..i - ncedes that P-7 
; • 6 55 56] 
..t' :- est if i G ::! oi i 
w a s i i o t c 1 e a r t • D 1: i i in, 
^ testi fi e :i tl lat she 
. 11 e r b r o 11 i e i: i i i h e r 
88 ] On cross 
>a] ] i proi:; i ded 
..nauie to explai i i or 
i ; r. [T 9 6-97] 
Paragr apl l t ; * o i i I P] a :ii i iti f f s ' ' Exhi bi t I states a. s f :>] ] J\\ s : 
What I wi 1 1 need from. , cu < i copy of their 
offer to buy properly signed by them and 
noterized [sic] . Also a copy of the sales 
agreement. I wil 1 give you a letter signed by 
Beth, Gen, And [sic] myself releasing you from 
our option of first right of refusal, 
Smitt estimony SGF regardir _: i ac 
Q. [BY MR. HUGHES] And in that letter, 
you state, "Send me the documents, and If 1 ] 
give yoi i the re 1 ease" ? 
A [BY JESSE SMITH] H< )W many ti mes 
have I sail d "yes" to that? 
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Q. BY MR. HUGHES: And did — what I am 
saying is did you state in that letter "Send 
me the documents, but if I don't like the 
terms I discover, I'll refuse to give you a 
release"? 
A. Well, I would guess that would be 
understood. 
Q. Oh. And where would it be under-
stood from D-4, [sic] that that was your 
intent, Mr. Smith? 
A. It wouldn't, I guess. The way it's 
written. [T 102-103] 
Q. All right. Paragraph 2, particular-
ly. Did you mean Paragraph 2 as it is writ-
ten? Did you mean it to have the clear import 
of its language? 
A. Obviously not or I wouldn't be here 
right now. 
Q. Why were you upset? 
A. I was upset because she had sold 
without getting my — my and Gen's and Beth's 
release from the first right of refusal. 
Q. But on September 29, days before you 
received these documents, you promised her, 
did you not, in P-4, that upon the receipt of 
those documents, you would send her your 
release? 
A. I'd send her a release if I couldn't 
meet it. If I couldn't duplicate the deal. 
Q. But that's not what P-4 says, is it? 
A. I realize that. We've been over 
this before. I said that's not — in the 
context you're taking it, it is not what I 
really meant. [T 123-134] [Emphasis added.] 
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THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS, A LACK OF MUTUALITY, 
AND THE FAILURE OF BETH SMITH TO TESTIFY 
PRECLUDE HER FROM ASSERTING ANY CLAIM. 
I !: 1 I a s 1 i e i e t o £ o i: e b e e i i s t a t e d 11: i a t 11 i e s t i p I I J a 1: i c i I 
reserving a fi rst: r :i ght of refusal between the vari ous co-tenants 
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wife exception to the statute of frauds, it is clear that Jesse 
Smith can neither act nor speak on behalf of his wife. [See Coombs 
v. Ouzounian. 465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970).] Thus, Beth's claim that 
Exhibit P-1 granted her a right of first refusal fails because, if 
that right was created inter se, then it was created between 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Salli Smith West. Beth 
Smith was never mentioned in that document as a grantee or tenant 
in common to the subject matter property. 
As previously set forth, Beth Smith never had a right of 
first refusal running to her from Salli Smith West. Beyond this, 
Beth Smith, though present, was not called as a witness and 
provided no testimony as to her intent or desire with reference to 
Salli1s interest in the property. Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence pertains to the ability of the trial court to take 
judicial notice of certain matters. Judicial notice, however, may 
not be taken of a party's intent or state of mind. 
As the complaint is unverified and there exist no 
affidavits of Beth Smith in the record, no deposition taken, and no 
testimony, the presumption set forth in 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§ 14 is applicable here: 
There is a presumption that when a cause is 
presented for trial, the court and jury are 
uninformed concerning the facts involved, and 
it is incumbent upon the parties to the pro-
ceeding to establish by evidence the facts 
upon which they rely. 
There is no basis in law or in fact upon which the trial court 
could take judicial notice that the filing of a cause of action 
alone constitutes notice of an individual party's intent. Two 
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of the Intermediate Court of Appeals oi I the matter is tell Ir lg: 
Barke r wa s free at t r i a. 1 to p re s ent ev i denc e 
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competent evidence on the issue of damages is 
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Beth Smith presented i 10 testimony,, i 10 written document; 
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upon which the appellate court can find in her favor. Absent her 
testimony at trial on the issue of her intent, her appeal should be 
summarily dismissed, and the trial court's ruling that it could not 
find in her favor should be sustained on the multiple grounds 
referenced herein. 
VIII. 
THOUGH NOT AN APPELLANT, GENEVIEVE SMITH 
LACKED STANDING TO ASSERT ANY FIRST RIGHT 
OP REFUSAL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
In the instant case, it does not appear that Genevieve 
Smith has pursued cin appeal, but rather that the appeal has been 
brought solely by Jesse Smith and his wife Beth Smith. Respon-
dents, however, refer this Court to the trial court's Memorandum 
Opinion as to the standing of Genevieve Smith before the trial 
court. [R 214-215] 
It is clear that the stipulation allowed co-tenants a 
specific right of first refusal. [P 1, at f 5] Similarly, 
Plaintiffs1 complaint bottomed their cause of action on their 
status as Salli's co-tenant as to the subject property. [R 1] 
Findings of Fact No.'s 29 through 32 in the record detail 
Genevieve's loss of standing to pursue her cause of action, based 
on the probate stipulation, before the trial court. [R 2 34] 
Approximately one year prior to the trial, Genevieve, without 
notice to anyone, conveyed her interest in the subject property to 
a Nevada corporation. Rights of first refusal are freely assign-
able by grant or devise. [See Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois, 14 
Utah 2d 188, 380 P«2d 931 (1963).] In analogous cases involving 
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nnqu i s i tP : '-' ' 
statute of frauds has been satisfied. 
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The Decree of Distribution and final deed in Elias Penn 
Smith's probate merged and terminated any right of first refusal 
contained in the earlier stipulation filed in the probate. This 
type of reservation is clearly not collateral to the quality of 
title. 
Beth Smith cannot prevail, as she was never privy to the 
first right of refusal and offered no testimony at trial. 
Genevieve Smith had conveyed her interest in the property to a 
Nevada corporation without reservation in the deed. At trial, she 
no longer had standing to assert a claim as a co-tenant. 
Ultimately, it becomes clear that Salli Smith West is the 
real loser in this litigation. Under the trial court's findings 
and Utah law, she is required to bear Respondents1 attorney's fees. 
These findings are not contested on appeal. Respondents' attorney 
respectfully submits that the appeal, in light of the facts 
elucidated at trial, may fall within the parameters of § 78-27-56 
of the Utah Code. The respect of Respondents' counsel for 
Appellants' counsel is not compromised by this fact; rather, it 
becomes clear that he has done his best given the facts provided 
him. However, Jesse's actions, despite his covert intent, which 
actions were relied on by Salli Smith West and Respondents Anderson 
and Appleby, have caused Salli enough expense already. Conse-
quently, the application of § 78-27-56 to the appellate portion of 
this case to assess Appellants a portion of those fees may indeed 
be justified. 
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MICHAEL W. PARK 
Attorney for Peititoner 
110 North Main Street, Suite F 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: 586-3879 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
) STIPULATION AND PETITION 
OF ) FOR DISTRIBUTION 
) 
ELIAS PENN SMTH. Deceased ^ Probate No, 2,070 
iti hxecutrix, Genevieve A Smith, and all. of the 
ot the estate, Jesse E, Smith, Salli Smith Oirard, and 
P enn H a r m ; Smith, h e r e b v S t i p 11 i a t e i i n d p e f: i t i o n t h »:j C our"! , i s 
follows * 
The Petitioners, beiny all oi i lie H»I r j " i hi' 
estate of 1", V enn S mi t h , h e r e D v Petition tut1 u o u r t r o r ii itricuLi i,»11 
of the property of the estate in accordance wi.tn this Stipulation 
hereinafter set forth, 
1
 'I'h*1 heir si of the estate hereby agree that Genevieve 
A, Still fh, , i esse E Smith, Salli Smith Girard and Penn Harris 
S mi t h shall e a eh p a y t w en t v f i ve p e r c e n t (2 5% ) o £ t h e t o t a 1 
liabilities of the estate in order to retire all debts which have 
been assessed against the estate Ihe case pa.yments which 
should be made out of the est a t e a t t h i s t ime amo un t t o a t o t a 1 
of $48,557,00 The total ca:.h on hand, includes the sum of 
"'". f'" " ' ) , matcinp; the net liability payable by the estate in 
sain * f5,000 nil Ljch IHM11 j o the estate, therefore, is 
indebted for the Liabilities m the sum of $11,250 00 
3 . Th e parties hereby s tipu 1 ate and agree tha fi the 
propertv listed in tne Inventory and Apprai sernent and known as 
the Industry! ] 11 o p e r t y b h a LI be aw ax d e d t; o P enn H ar r i s Smith 
and Salli Smith (»11;ar d as tenants in, common, with Sa 11 i Smith 
Girard beIny, f»n t i t 1 ec 1 t.u rwenrv-nine percent: (29X) of said 
property and Penn Harris Sun f0 facing entitl ed to seventy-one 
percent (7 "Ti or sdid proper! n 
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4. As consideration for the above, Perm Harris 
Smith and Salli Smith Girard agree to pay to Genevieve A. 
Smith and Jesse E. Smith the total sum of $12,250.00. Penn 
Harris Smith shall release any and all claim to the Pah Tempe 
Springs property, the Magelby property located in Pintura Utah, 
and the balance due on the sales contract between Jesse E. 
Smith and Elias Penn Smith. Salli Smith Girard shall release 
any and all claim she has to the Magelby property located in 
Pintura Utah. Salli Smith Girard shall also release any and 
all interest she has in and to the real estate sales agreement 
between E. Penn Smith and Genevieve A. Smith Sellers and 
Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith Buyers. 
5. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, the 
description of which is situated in the Inventory and Appraisement, 
should be distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, 
and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in common. 
6. The property known as the Magelby property located 
in Pintura Utah should be distributed to Jesse E. Smith and 
Genevieve A. Smith as tenants in common, and Penn Harris Smith 
and Salli Smith Girard hereby release any and all claim in and 
to said property. The proceeds from the real estate contract 
made between Elias Penn Smith and Genevieve A. Smith and Jesse E. 
Smith and Beth M. Smith shall become the property of Jesse E. 
Smith and Genevieve A. Smith, and Penn Harris Smith and Salli 
Smith Girard shall release any and all interest in and to said 
property. 
7. The persons who take the property described above, 
shall take their property subject to any and all encumbrance which 
may exist thereon or any and all lease, rental or other assessment 
which may attach to that property, as of this date. 
8. The parties who take the property set forth above 
as tenants in common, hereby agree to grant their fellow tenants 
a right of first refusal to buy their interest in said property 
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in the event that tenant wishes to sell. That tenant shall 
advise the co-tenant of his desire to sell and if a bona fide 
offer is recieved from a third party, that offer must be met 
or the tenant may sell to said third party or any other third 
party. If the tenant desires to excercise the right of first 
refusal and a third offer is unavailable, then the interest 
shall be determined by an evaluation of the fair market value 
of said property which can be accomplished by the appointment 
of appraisers by said tenants. Each tenant shall appoint an 
appraiser and if the tenants are still in disagreement, those 
appraisers shall appoint another appraiser and the decision of 
that appraiser shall be final. 
9. The parties have divided the personal property 
among themselves. 
10. Salli Smith Girard and her husband are presently 
indebted to the Estate in the sum of $2,224.00. 
11. The heirs accept the accounting of Genevieve A. 
Smith concerning the assets and liabilities of the estate and 
further agree with a payment to her of an executrix fee in the 
sum of $3,220.00. 
12. All of the parties to this agreement shall be 
responsible for one-fourth (1/4) of any additional taxes or 
estate debts and same shall be paid by the heirs within 30 
days of notification of that debt. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray the Court for an 
Order distributing the property in accordance with the Petition 
and Stipulation set forth above. 
DATED, this V ^ d a y of February, 1977. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
} s s 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith Girard, 
Penn Harris Smith, being the petitioners in all of the heirs to 
the Estate of Elias Penn Smith, hereby state that they have read 
the foregoing Petition and Stipulation and are aware of the 
contents thereof and duly acknowledge that they signed said 
document. 
DATED, this £ day of^TI^^w-> , 1977. 
hL_S^xk. ^ U A C I 
EZNN HARRISvSMITH 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this s 
1977. 
Residing-a 
My Commission expires: 
MICHAEL W. PARK, ESQ. I c j i r q q , „„ _ *P* 2 2 7989 
A t t o r n e y for Execu t r ix ^ ^ ^ 3 & H 4 . Fee J22,00 • 
110 North Main, S u i t e "F" MmWVmi r« 
Cedar C i t y , Utah 84720 ^ f ' ^ J ^ A. 
Telephone: 586-3879 D*'<> AW>^;U977 .f W.10.M 
Boot ?-^Z^^.V.524-S3JL_ 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 












DECREE OF FINAL DISTRIBUTION 
AND ORDER APPROVING FIRST 
AND FINAL ACCOUNT AND REPORT 
OF ADMINISTRATION 
Probate No. 2070 
GENEVIEVE A. SMITH, Executrix of the Estate of ELIAS PENN 
SMITH, Deceased, having filed herein her verified First and Final 
Account and Report of Administration and Petition for Decree of Final 
Distribution, and notice of said Account, Report and Petition having 
been given to the satisfaction of the Court and in accordance with law 
and pursuant to the course and practice of this Court, and said Account, 
Report and Petition coming on regularly for hearing this 20th day of 
July, 1977, and there being no protests, or objections, thereto in any 
manner, or from anyone whomsoever, and the Court having heard and 
considered said Account, Report and Petition and the matter adduced 
in support thereof, and being now fully advised in the premises, and 
having considered the files and records therein, the Court now finds 
and adjudicates: 
And it further appearing that the said Account is in all 
respects true and correct; it further appearing that all of the claims 
presented and allowed have been paid; it further appearing that all 
funeral expenses, costs and expenses of last illness, costs and expenses 
of administration have been paid; and it further appearing that no State 
inheritance taxes are due and payable and that the Executrix, heirs-at-
law, legatees and devisees have executed a Bond in the amount of the 
Federal Inheritance estate taxes due and that the same will be paid upon 




And it further appearing that all charges and taxes of any 
kind and nature to be paid, have been paid, excepting as hereinabove 
set forth and as may be hereinafter ser forth: 
And it further appearing that no assets have come into the 
hands of the Executrix since the filing of her First and Final Account 
and Report and Petition for Distribution; 
And it further appearing that the within entitled Estate 
is in all respects in a condition to be closed and the assets of the 
Estate distributed to those entitled thereto. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That due and legal notice of the hearing of the First 
and Final Account and Report of said Executrix and her Petition for 
Final Distribution has been given; 
2. That the First and Final Account and Report and Petition 
for Final Distribution of said Executrix be, and the same is. hereby 
£) settled, approved and allowed; 
- 3. That upon payment of the federal Estate Inheritance CO 
taxes due and owing in this estate, the sureties and principals of the 
Bond executed to cover the payment of the same, should be, and hereby 
are, exonerated and released from any further liability thereunder. 
4. The property available for distribution at this time 
is the property set forth in Exhibits "A", "B" , "C", "D", and "EM, 
attached hereto, and should be distributed in accordance with the 
Stipulation filed herein and as set forth hereafter. 
A. All of the property set forth in Exhibit "A" is awarded 
to Penn Harris Smith and Sally Smith Girard as tenants in common, with 
Sally Smith Girard being entitled to 297« of said property and Penn 
Harris Smith being entitled to 717* of said property. 
B. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs and set 
forth in Exhibit "B" attached hereto is distributed to Genevieve A. 
Smith, Jesse E. Smith and Sally Smith Girard, each having a 1/3 
interest, as tenants in common. 5/25 
C. The property known as the Magelby property which is 
set forth on Exhibit "C" attached hereto is distributed to Jesse E. 
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Smith and GenevieVe A. Smith, each with a 507* interest as tenants in 
Common. 
D. The property set forth in Exhibit "D" is awarded to 
Jesse E. Smith and Beth M. Smith, his wife, 507, and Genevieve A. 
Smith 507., as tenants in common. 
E, The property set forth in Exhibit "E" is awarded to 
Genevieve A. Smith. 
5. All of the property is awarded pursuant to the Stipu-
lation and agreement of the parties which is filed with this Court. 
6. The heirs have divided the personal property among 
themselves and each heir is entitled to the personal property now 
in his possession. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the 
Executrix be, and she is, discharged from her capacity as such and 
exonerated from all liability by reason of her future acts and her 
bond is exonerated. 
DATED, thisc^? day of July, 1977. 
" "" " " - DISTRICT JUDGE J. HARLAN BURNS DIS' 
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 k^.... Ref»; 
Mall tax notice tO_-*—»-.,. .*...* »^< Address . ._ , 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, Salli 
Smith Girard, Penn Harris Smith, and Mary A. Smith, his wife, grantors 
of , County o£ Washington , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
Penn Harris Smith, and Maty A. Smith, his wife, as joint tenants with 
full right of survivorship, Seventy one percent (71%); and Salli 
Smith Girard, Twenty Nine Percent (297.). grantees 
of Washington County for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and No/100 - -- — — -—DOLLARS, 
Washington 
3! 
the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
Northeast % Northwest k Northwest k; Northeast %; Section 20, 
Township 42 South, Range 15 West, consisting of 80 acres: ALSO, 
beginning at the Northwest corner of the Southwest % of the North-
east k Section 20 running thence South 620 feet; thence East 400 
feet; to the old Highway 91; thence Northeasterly along Highway to 
-East line of the Southwest % of the Northeast k; thence North, to the 
Northeast corned thence west 1320 feet to the point of beginning. 
1'.'05 acres sold to Penn H. Smith. Less 5.0 acres sold to St. 
George City, 3.163 acres sold to 0. M. Porter Distributing. LESS 
1.336 acres sold to Kenneth Newby. 
Lots front of Bradshaw Trailer Estate: Beginning at the JJoutbjcr,'c 
corner of the Southwest \ Northeast Section 20, Tcr.^ ship 42 South, 
Range 15 West, Salt. Lake Meridian; thence North 700 feet; thence East 
400- feet to the highway; thence Southwest along Highway, 760 feet 
to the point of beginning. Containing 5 acres, Less 3 acres sold to 
Starling. 
County, 
WITNESS the hand o£ said grantor , tins
 ; 5 th « day o£ 
March. . A. D. one thousand nincyhtindrcd and ^y J' ~y?/ 
Signed in the presence of 
/ . •••? ' /? 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of IRON _ _ _ _ ^ 
On the 5 th day of i^March A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and s e v e n t y s e v e n personally appeared before me G e n e v i e v e A. 
A. S m i t h , J e s s e E. S m i t h , B e t h S m i t h , S a l l i Smith Garard, Penn H. 
S m i t h , .and Mary A- Smith 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me thay-h hey ^executed die 
same. v / , ' C , 5 2 7 
/ )V<VvV •(.«<( • ° ' 5 ' 
Noc.iry Public.— 
My commission expires 1 - 1 2 - 8 1 Address: Cedar C i t y , Utah 0 
OUAHrt HO. 1 0 3 - © O«M r i« ,
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Genvieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, Salli 
Smith Girard, Penn Harris Smith, and Mary A. Smith, his wife, grantors 
of , County of Washington , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to Genevieve A. Smith, thirty three and one-third 
percent (33 1/3%); Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, as 
joint tenants with full right of survivorship, thirty Three and one-
third percent (33 1/3%); and Salli Smith Girard, thirty three and 
one-third percent (33 1/3%); grantee 
of Washington County, Utah for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and NO/100------ DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in W a s h i n g t o n County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning a t a po in t i n middle of the channel of Virgin River loca ted 
d i r e c t l y South from a poin t 15.4 chains East of Northwest Comer of 
the Northeast k Southeast k Sec t ion 26, Township 41 South, Range 13 
West, Sa l t Lake Meridian and running thence North 9.4 cha ins , more or 
l e s s to a point 30 f e e t South of a l i n e sepera t ing the Southeast k and 
the Northeast k of sa id Sec t ion 26; thence South 37° Eas t 9.7 cha ins , 
more or l e s s ; thence South 23°45' West 5.4 cha ins ; thence South 08° 
East 24.50 chains , more o r l e s s , to the middle of Virgin River, to 
a po in t , which i s 14 chains West and 15 chains South from the Northeast 
_ Comer of the Southwest k Sec t ion 25; thence follow dnwnstreor.i th«* 
0? middle of the River to the po in t of beginning. AT .SO V><*py inning a t 
Q^ a point 10 Chains South of the Northwest comer of Lhe Southw::at k 
£Q Southwest qua r t e r Sect ion 25, Township 41 South, Range 13 West, S a l t 
QO Lake Base and'Meridian and running thence East 30 chains thence Norther ly 
W 30 Chains, more or l e s s to the poin t of i n t e r s e c t i o n of the middle 
of the channel of the Virgin River with the l i n e s epe ra t i ng the Southwest 
k and Northwest k of Sect ion 25, then follow downstream the middle 
of the River to a po in t where sa id r i v e r i n t e r s e c t s the Eas t e r ly doundary 
l ine of Highway U-17; thence South 21° 04' West 15 Chains, more or 
l e s s to the South boundary l i n e of Northeast k Southeast k Sect ion 26; 
thence East 19 chains , more o r l e s s to the Southeast corner of: tho 
Northeast k Southeast k\ thence South 10 chains to beginning. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this' 5-th day o£ 
March
 9 A. D. one thousand nine {fundrcd and s e v e n t y sevofi ''J?J 
Signed in the presence of \.../?-&?--£ ' „.-g£5y**x^ 
1 ^ ^,aw^B.,A,f 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of I R O N 
On the 5 t h day of March A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and s e v e n t y s e v e n personally appeared before me 
G e n e v i e v e A, . S m i t h , J e s s e S m i t h , Be th S m i t h , S a l l i S m i t h G i r a r d ^ 5 2 8 
Penn H. S m i t h a n d Mary A. S m i t h 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, Who duly acknowledge to me that t he v executed the 
My commisiion expires l u 1 2 - 8 l Addrcss;Cedar C i t y , U tah 
• LANK NO. 1 0 . — © • • » • riQ, _ . . - * • * » • »<». l«QO »A»f — »ALT CAKC CITY 
Notary Public, (j ' 
Recorded at Request of 
at M. Feo Paid $.._ , 
b y . . _ , j}Cp. Boole— m p a 5 e j^ef.; 
Mail tax notice to _ Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
G e n e v i e v e A. S m i t h , J e s s e E . S m i t h , and B e t h M. S m i t h , h i s w i f e , S a l l i 
S m i t h G i r a r d , Penn H a r r i s S m i t h , and Mary A. S m i t h , h i s w i f e , g r antorS 
of , County of W a s h i n g t o n , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to G e n e v i e v e A.- S m i t h , F i f t y P e r c e n t ( 5 0 % ) ; and J e s s e 
E . S m i t h , and B e t h M, S m i t h , h i s w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s w i t h f u l l 
r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , f i f t y p e r c e n t ( 5 0 % ) . 
grantees 
oi W a s h i n g t o n C o u n t y , U t a h for the sum of 
Ten d o l l a r s a n d N o / 1 0 0 - - - D O L L A R S , 
the following described tract of land in W a s h i n g t o n County, 
State oi Utah: 
Beg a t a p t 1546,6 f t S & W 780.3 f t from Atr cor to Sec 1 & 2, TODS, 
R13W, SLB&M, sd p t be ing E R-O-W l i n e of Hg 91 , Sec 2, th S 75° E 45.0 
f t ; th S 3°54' E 318.8 f t ; th N 75° W 160.0 f t , to E l i n e of sd Hgwy 91 ; 
th N a lng sd E lne of Hgwy
 ; a d i s t of 300.00 f t , to p t of beg. 
Beg a t the SW cor of NE quar of SE quar of Sec 2, T40S, R13W,SLD<SM, th N 
8.0 ch; th E 10.0 ch; th S 16°22* W about 8.5 ch; th W to p t of beg. 
Beg a p t S 822.0 f t N 74°30' f t W 514.0 f t & S 16°22' W 295.3 f t f«":om 
quar t cor to Sec 1 & 2,T40S, R13W, SUB6M, to the TORE FOIWr OF BEG, 
th S 73° E 208.7 f t ; th S 16°22' W 208.7 f t ; th M 73° W 142.0 f t ; lh S 
w 16°22' W 66.0 f t ; th, N 74° W 66.0 f t , to E Bound l i n e oc Hrjwv 91; Lh N 
p j 16°22' E 274.7 f t to the p t of beg, p a r t of l o t 10, Bl 2, Ga tes ' Entry 
p j in the NE quar of SE quar of sd Sec 2. 
lQ Beg S 822.0 f t from the quar cor to Sec 1 & 2, T40S, B13W, SU3&H, Lh S 
00 74°30' E 700.0 F t ; t h S 16°22' W 608.3 f t ; th S 27°53' W 643.0 f t ; th 
W N 71°15* W 216.0 pt; th S 548.0 f t ; th W 1320.0 f t th N 1262.0 f t ; th 
S 73° E 536.6 f t ; t h N 16°22' E 318.0 f t ; th S 73° E 66.0 f t ; t h N 16°22' 
E 66.0 f t ; th N 73° 142.0 f t ; th N 16°22' E 208.0 f t ; th N 73° W 208.0 f t ; 
th N 16°22' E 295.3 f t ; th S 74°30' E 514.0 f t , to the p t of beg, cont 
54.15 a c r e s , Les9 p a r t used for hgwy purposes, Less 1.0 a c r e so ld to 
V. T i sda le , Less 0.48 ac re deeded to S t a t e Road Corrm., Less any por t ion 
for pub l i c s t r e e t . , 
I nc ld . 26 shares i n P i n t u r a Water Company 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 5 t h day of 
March , A. D. one thousand ninevjiundrcd and S e v e n t y / S e v e n ^ 
Signed in the presence of j —.r^ l.-ji/^ -f-.-:—-^ — ..'sL-p-^u./.±:iizZ. — 
. ) _ J ^ < i ^ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 _ J V - U A ^ /YJ\^ ''""'" 
County of IRON J " " ' ^ T ^ u , f< • / L / ^ A " 
On the 5 t h day of J March A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and S e v e n t y Seven personally appeared before me 
G e n e v i e v e A. S m i t h , J e s s e S m i t h , B e t h S m i t h , S a l l i S m i t h G i r a r d , 
Penn H. S m i t h , a n d Mafy A, S m i t h 5 2 9 
the signer*"of the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that t hey executed the 
same.
 v /) , < / 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires 1 - 1 2 - 8 1 Address; C e d a r C i t y , Utuh 84720 
PLANK MO. 1 0 3 — O « * » flO, OO. — s a l t » 0 . »«00 « * • * — HUT tAK« CITV 
Recorded at Request of. 
at . M. Fee Paid $ 
by Dep. Book Page Ref. 
Mail tax notice to Address 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, Salli 
Smith Girard, Penn Harris Smith, and Mary A. Smith, his wife, grantors 
of , County of Washington , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to 
Genevieve A. Smith, Fifty Percent (50%); and Jesse E. Smith, and 
Beth M. Smith, his wife, as joint tenants with full right of 
survivorship, Fifty percent (50%), grantees 
f Washington County, Utah for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and No/100- DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in W a s h i n g t o n County, 
State of Utah: 
Beg a t a p t 356.0 f t W from the Qrt cor to sec 1 & 2, T40S, R13W, SLB<SM, 
th W 325.0 f t ; th S &152' W 128.0 f t ; th S 77°59' E 292.4 f t ; th N 16°45' 
E 196.0 f t , to t h p t of beg. 
Pa r ce l 2: Lot 7, Bl 2, of Gates' survey, p a r t of l o t 5, b l 3 , of Gates' 
Survey, W of Par 3 'he re in , s i t 5n Sec 1 & 2, T 40 S, Tl.'iW, SLB&M. 
Pa rce l 3, Beg a t p t E 746.0 E 746.0 f t from q r t cor to Sec 1 & 2f T40S, 
^ R13W, SLB&M, th E 171.7 f t ; th S 16°22' W 537.0 f t ; tli II 73°33' W 1*4.2 
$ f t , t o a p t S 16°22' W 488.2 f t from p t of b c 5 , th M Ki ,22l:t E 4SU.2 f t , 
£7} to the p t of beg. 2 .0 .ac res more or l e s s . 1 Share i n P i n t u r a Culinary 
lO Water Stock, and 7% shares in Pin tura I r r i g a t i o n Cousin/ pr iuury stock. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this 5 t h day of 
March , A. D. one thousand nine.hundred and S e v e n t y Seven . . 
Signed in the presence of 
>_^*.<fe£ 
iS^ih^^AL^^vAAi^^^^^ii 
-??v,^ .<•. ;h,,;q 
STATE O? UTAH, 
County of IRON 
On the 5 t h day of •/ March A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and S e v e n t y Seven personally appeared before me 
G e n e v i e v e A. S m i t h , J e s s e S m i t h , B e t h , S m i t h , S a l l i S m i t h G i r a r d > t r Q 
Penn H. S m i t h and Mary A. S m i t h ^ U 
the signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to me that t hey executed the 
same. / ' ."* 
Notary Public. 
My commission expires 1 - 1 2 - 8 1 Address: C e d a r C i t y , U tah 
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HAMS lARSEN, a single man, Grantor, of Mora, Kanabeck 
County, Minnesota, hereby CONVEYS and WARRANTS to E. PfcNN SMITH 
and GENE1EVE SMITH, his wife, as joint tenants and not as 
tenants in common but with full rights of survivorship, Grantees, 
of St. George, County of Washington, State of Utah, for the sum 
of Ten ($10.00) Dollars and other good and valuable consideration 
the following described tract of land* in Washington County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
PARCEL #1: Commencing at a point on the North boundary of 
Section 1, Township 40 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, from which the NW Corner of Section 1 bears N 89° 2*4' 
West 1120.91 Said point is also on the easterly R/W of Interstat 
15, thence South 89°24! East 259.7* South 78°34f East 919.3ft 
South 33°30' West 576.0', South 49°25' West 763.0f, North 770381 
West 903. .V, to the easterly R/W Interstate 15, North 32°57' 
East 991.8', along said R/W, North 30°19' East 157.6' to the 
point of beginning. Containing 27.92 acres. 
PARCEL #2: Commencing at the Northwest Corner of Section 1, 
Township 40 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
thence along ;he North boundary of Section 1 South 89°24' East 
735.6', to a point on the westerly R/W of Interstate 15, South 
32°43' West 6*1.5' along said Hiway R/W, South 22o09' West 329.5' 
South 65°43' West 120.2, South 33°09' West 524.01, West 180.3' 
to a point on the West line of Section 1, North 853.3' along 
said West line of Section-1, to the point oC beginning. 
Containing 9.28 acres. 
PARCEL #3: Commencing at a point on the South boundary of S«:ctior| 
36, Township 39 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, 
from which the Southwest Corner of Section 36 bears North 89°24' 
West 1120.9' Said point is also on the easterly R/W of 
Interstate 15, thence South 89°24' East 1142.0', North 03°05' 
West 680.7', South 87°12! West 770.9' to a point on the easterly 
R/W of Interstate 15, South 26°26' West 415.41 along said 
easterly R/W, South 30°19f West 299.2' to the point of beginning. 
Containing 14.27 acres. 
Together with all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto. 
WITNESS THE hand of said Grantor, this A 7 ^ day of 
January, 1970. 
H£N$ CSRSEN 
.. cmAmr r\v. IITAU 
185994 
531 
EXHIBIT r l T 
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QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Genvieve A. Smith, Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, Salli 
Smith Girard, Penn Harris Smith, and Mary A. Smith, his wife, grantors 
of , County of Washington , State of Utah, hereby 
QUIT-CLAIM to Genevieve A. Smith, thirty three and one-third 
percent (33 1/3%); Jesse E. Smith, and Beth M. Smith, his wife, as 
joint tenants with full right of survivorship, thirty Three and one-
third percent (33 1/3%); and Salli Smith Girard, thirty three and 
one-third percent (33 1/3%); grantee 
of Washington County, Utah for the sum of 
Ten Dollars and NO/100--- --DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in W a s h i n g t o n County, 
State of Utah: 
Beginning a t a po in t i n middle of the channel of Virgin River loca ted 
d i r e c t l y South from a poin t 15.4 chains Eas t of Northwest Comer of 
the Nor theas t k Southeast k Sec t ion 26, Township 41 South, Range 13 
West, S a l t Lake Meridian and running thence North 9.4 cha ins , more or 
l e s s to a po in t 30 fee t South of a l i n e s e p e r a t i n g the Southeast k and 
the Nor theas t k of sa id Sect ion 26; thence South 07° East 9.7 cha ins , 
more o r l e s s ; thence South 23°45' West 5.4 c h a i n s ; thence South 60° 
Eas t 24.50 cha ins , more or l e s s , to the middle oJ: Virgin Fdvcr, to 
a p o i n t , which i s 14 chains West and 15 chains South ficm the Northeast 
^ Corner of the Southwest k Sec t ion 25; thence fol low d«v,»P';i;r<?iir,i tlm 
QF middle of the River to the p o i n t of beginning. AT£0 Bnf* inning at 
Q^ a po in t 10 Chains South o£ the Northwest corner of the Soulh>'v;t ]; 
j / j Southwest q u a r t e r Sect ion 25, Township 41 South, Range 13 West, S a l t 
GO Lake Base and P r i d i a n and running thence Eas t 30 chains thence Northerly 
T-f 30 Chains, more or l e s s to the po in t of i n t e r s e c t i o n of the middle 
of the channel of the Virgin River wi th the l i n e s epe ra t i ng the Southwest 
k and Northwest k of Sect ion 25, then follow downstream the middle 
of the River to a po in t where s a id r i v e r i n t e r s e c t s the Eas te r ly doundary 
l i n e of Highway U-17; thence South 21° 04' West 15 Chains, more or 
l e s s to the South boundary l i n e of Nor theas t k Southeast k Sect ion 26; 
thence Eas t 19 chains , more o r l e s s to the Southeas t corner of tVv* 
Nor theas t k Southeast k\ thence South 10 chains to beginning. 
APR 2 1 '^TTNESS the hand of said grantor , this' 5yth day of 
, A. D. one thousand nine ffufi'drcd and s e v e n t y , Severn ''y**J 
\ V ', £ V -
Signed in the presence or } „&!&<££. ^^pr.^-i 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 " j^^/fljp^, 
County of IRON J ' ~~*?} d it, /(. /h-^C-tfa 
On the 5 t h day of l March A. D. one 
thousand nine hundred and s e v e n t y s e v e n personally appeared before me 
G e n e v i e v e A* S m i t h , J e s s e S m i t h , B e t h S m i t h , S a l l i S m i t h G i r a r d , # 5 2 8 
Penn H. S m i t h a n d Mary A. S m i t h 
the signer ot the foregoing instrument, Who duly acknowledge to me that t he v executed the 
same. v>--./ / / , C ^ 
Notary Public, (j 
My commission expires l u 1 2 - 8 1 AddressrCedar C i t y , Utah 
H e n d e r s o n , M e v a d a 
SePt. 23 1936 
Dear Sally.. 
I have been unable to talK with Gen about the 
Springs- She had to taKe some horses to the 
coas1 and I do not Know f or 2-ure whien she will be 
bacK. I dorr't thinK she can come up with any 
money at the Present time because she is in a big 
law suit in Phoenix and is also being hounded by 
t h e I. R - S. ov e r M o u n t a. i n S h a d o w s. I c a n n o t 
hand1e *125,©©©- ©© by myse1f. 
What I will need from you is a copy of their 
offer to buy Properly signed by them and 
noterized- Rlso a copy of the sales agreement. 
I will give you a letter signed by Beth.. G^n, find 
rn y self releasing y o u f r o m o u r o P t i o n o f fir s1 
right of r^tusa1. 
Under the Present 
conditions., at Pah-TemPe, the $125, ©6©. ©9 offer 
from flPPleby & Anderson may look 9ood. but I 
thinK it is too low, however It would taKe more 
than 4© years to, get that money, and with out 
interest, from your Part of the rent. 
I am sure flPPleby & Anderson will be after me 
and Gen to sell after they get your Part. I 
will need some documentation in the event they 
exercise their option to buy Q^n and I out. 
As you may or ma.ynot Know an offer to buy 
real Property must be made in writing and signed 
to be valid under Utah law. I must have this 
documentation if it becomes nessesary to ha.ve an 
appraisal at a later- time. Please get this out 
to me soon. 
2 1 1289 
p. PLAINTIFFS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O ' 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE E. SMITH, BETH M. SMITH 
and GENEVIEVE A SMITH, 
Plaintiffs , 
vs. 
SALLI SMITH WEST, KEN ANDERSON 




Civil No. 86-1058 
This case involves a dispute over the effect of a 
"Right of First Refusal" included in a Stipulation and 
Petition for Distribution. This stipulation was signed and 
filed in the Estate of Elias Penn Smith. Part of the estate 
included some real property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs 
(hereinafter Pah Tempe). The stipulation provided for the 
division of some of the assets of the estate, including the 
Pah Tempe property, and contained in paragraph 8 a 
Right of First Refusal. This stipulation was signed by 
Genevieve A. Smith, the widow, Jesse E. Smith, Salli Smith 
Girard (now Salli Smith West) and Penn Harris Smith, as 
heirs. It provided in part as follows: 
"5. The property known as Pah Tempe 
Hot Springs, the description of which is 
situated in the Inventory and Appraisement, 
should be distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, 
Jesse E. Smith, and Salli Smith Girard, as 
tenants in common. 
"8.The parties who take the property 
set forth above as tenants in common, hereby 
agree to grant their fellow tenants a right 
of first refusal to buy their interest in 
said property in the event that tenant wishes O0Q212 \s* 
Beth M. Smith, the wife of Jesse E. Smith, was not a 
signer of the stipulation. She did not testify at the 
trial and gave no evidence whatsoever. 
The fact that the interest of Jesse Smith was conveyed 
to him and his wife, conceivably makes her a co-tenant, but 
does not make her a party to the stipulation nor the Right 
of First Refusal. 
This court determines that she has not established any 
evidence to support her complaint and hereby dismisses her 
complaint. 
The Defendants' contend that any Right of First 
Refusal contained in the stipulation was merged into the 
Decree of Distribution and deed. They cite the case of 
Davis vs Davis, (Oki.App., G32 P2d 769) as their authority 
for the claim, This court finds that case is 
distinguishable. The Utah case of G.G.A., vs Leventis, (107 
Utah Adv. Rep 65) is more in point. The agreement of First 
Refusal is certainly a collateral agreement to the division 
and distribution of the property in the estate. It is the 
obvious intent of the parties that the First Refusal would 
continue on after the property was distributed. This court, 
therefore, determines that there was no merger and that the 
First Refusal continued to exist. The parties by their 
subsequent conduct continued to show that they considered 
the right to exist. 
Having determined that the right survived, the court 
then considers the claims of each of the parties. 0 ^ 0 2 
(1) This court determines that Salii Smith gave 
sufficient notice to the defendant, Jesse Smith, on 
September 2G , 1986, by a verbal notice of the offer of 
Appleby and Anderson. Mr. Smith said he had no 
desire to meet the offer. He further assured West that he 
would send her a letter to that effect. On September 29, 
1986, he sent a letter to West saying, "I will give you a 
letter signed by Beth, Gen, and myself releasing you from 
our option of first right of refusal." He did not send that 
letter. In fact he then stalled by asking for documents 
that seem irrelevant to the "right". I find that Mr. 
Smith, agreed to the sale by West in the telephone 
conversation on September 2G, 1986, and that he gave up any 
claim he had under his Right of First Refusal at that time. 
Further more, I find that by his representation in the phone 
conversation and also by the letter, he is estopped from 
asserting the claim. Mrs. West, in reliance upon his 
representations, consumated her sale and put herself in a 
position of jeopordy by his conduct. The plaintiffs further 
argue that there was an offer on July 23, 1986, which should 
have been communicated to the plaintiffs. This offer was 
never accepted by Salli Smith and there was no need to 
communicate it. As Judge Greenwood stated in the G.G.A. 
Case (supra ) , 
"A right of first refusal to purchase 
property is different from an option in that a 
right of first refusaal is not binding unless the 
offeror decides to sell the property." 
(2) Genevieve Smith created a Nevada corporation and 
transferred her interest in the Pah Tempe property to this 
corporation. She did not feel that she had to offer the 
property to anyone else because it was "her corporation" and 
that the first refusal did not apply. Whether or not it 
applied becomes immaterial at this point because she is no 
longer a co-tenant and has no right to claim the benefit of 
such a right. The courts have long distinguished between 
the individual and a corporation. The fact that she may be 
the sole stockholder does not alter the fact that she is no 
longer a co-tenant. The court must hold against her on her 
claim. 
<3> Beth M. Smith is not a party to the stipulation 
and cannot claim any rights under it. 
This court having decided the issues on the 
plaintiffs' complaint against the plaintiffs, no cause of 
action, their complaint must be dismissed. 
Since the court has decided against the plaintiffs, 
the cross claim of the defendants, Appleby and Anderson, 
should likewise be dismissed. 
Costs are hereby awarded to the defendants. 
Counsel for the defendants is directed to prepare and 
submit Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment 
in conformity with this Memorandum. 
Dated this X^day of May, 1989. 
Dean E. C~onder 
Senior Judge 
cc Sent to all counsel, 000215 
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SALLI SMITH WEST, 
Cross-Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-1058 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on the 
21st day of April, 1989, without a jury, and Plaintiffs being 
represented by and through their attorney of record James L. 
Shumate, and Defendants and Cross-Claimants Ken Anderson and 
Charles L. Appleby, Jr. being present and represented by their 
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attorney of record Michael D. Hughes, and Defendant and Cross-
Defendant Salli Smith West appearing pro se, and the Court having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and having received the 
evidentiary support for both Plaintiffs1 unverified complaint and 
the defenses proposed by Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and Cross-
Defendants, and the matter having been briefly argued and supple-
mented by written memoranda, now, therefore, the Court hereby 
enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows, 
to-wit: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The pleadings were properly joined for trial, though 
a precipe for default and default judgment had been entered against 
Defendant and Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West and filed with the 
Court on April 14, 1989. Salli Smith West never filed a reply to 
said cross-claim. 
2. This case involved the Plaintiffs1 collective 
request for specific performance of a "right of first refusal" 
included in a Stipulation and Petition for Distribution (hereafter 
"Stipulation") , arising in the matter of the Estate of Elias Penn 
Smith, Washington County Probate No. 2070, and marked and received 
into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 1 (hereafter P.l). 
3. Part of the estate mentioned in said Stipulation 
(P.l) included real property known as Pah Tempe Hot Springs, which 
is the subject matter of the case at bar. 
4. The Stipulation (P.l) was signed by Genevieve A. 
Smith, Jesse E. Smith, Penn Harris Smith, and Salli Smith Girard 
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(n.k.a. Salli Smith West) and provided as follows: 
5. The property known as Pah Tempe Hot 
Springs, the description of which is situated 
in the Inventory and Appraisement, should be 
distributed to Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E. 
Smith, and Salli Smith Girard, as tenants in 
common. 
8, The parties who take the property set 
forth above as tenants in common, hereby agree 
to grant their fellow tenants a right of first 
refusal to buy their interest in said property 
in the event that tenant wishes to sell. 
5. Penn Harris Smith was not to be named as a tenant 
in common to this property and, indeed, was not a party to this 
lawsuit. 
6. Though the Stipulation (P.l) was executed in 
February of 1977, the Defendants produced the Decree of Final 
Distribution and Order Approving First and Final Account and Report 
of Administration (hereafter "Decree") , which was marked and 
received by the Court as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 8 (D.8). 
7. The July, 1977, Decree (D.8) makes no mention of the 
right of first refusal, and has attached thereto as Exhibit "B" a 
Quit Claim Deed which varies from the Stipulation (P-1) in that the 
one-third interest to be awarded to Jesse E. Smith was conveyed to 
him and his wife Beth M. Smith; and, further, said deed, as 
subsequently recorded, contains no "first right of refusal" or 
other language which would facially limit a grantee-tenant's right 
to alienate his or her interest in the same. 
•-> #~%/^ o o o 
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8. Beth M. Smith was not a signor of the original 
Stipulation (P.l) and, further, the Plaintiff Beth M. Smith offered 
no testimony at trial and gave no evidence whatsoever therein. 
9. Though Beth M. Smith received, by the Decree and the 
deed of conveyance attached thereto (D.8), an interest in the 
subject-matter property which conceivably makes her a co-tenant, 
that interest did not make her a party to the Stipulation (P.l) 
executed in February of 1977, nor to the right of first refusal 
contained in paragraph eight thereof. 
10. Insofar as Beth M. Smith offered no evidence in 
support of her position as a holder of any right of first refusal 
as against any of the Defendants, she did not give any evidence 
whatsoever to establish any support of her complciint, and, there-
fore, the same should be dismissed with prejudice. 
11. Defendants contended at trial that the right of 
first refusal contained in the Stipulation (P.l) was merged into 
the Decree and the deed which was attached thereto (D.8). In 
support of this proposition Defendants have cited, inter alia, the 
case of Davis v. Davis 632 P.2d 769 (Okla. App.)„ 
12. The case of G.G.A. v. Laventis, 773 P.2d 841 (Utah 
App. 1989) is more in point, in that the Court finds the right of 
first refusal to be a collateral agreement to the division and 
distribution of the property in the estate. In so finding, the 
Court finds that it was the obvious intent of the signatories to 
the Stipulation (P.l) that the right of first refusal would 
continue between those signatories as tenants in common and family 
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members after the property was distributed. The Court therefore 
finds that there was no merger of the right of first refusal in the 
Decree and deed issued and subsequently recorded thereunder (D.8), 
and that the right of first refusal continued to exist. The 
signatories to the Stipulation (P.l) who appeared at trial and 
testified continued to show, by their subsequent conduct, that they 
considered the right of first refusal to exist between them, and 
that said right was designed to allow co-tenants in common a right 
to purchase any interest of another co-tenant desirous of selling 
his or her interest in and to the commonly-held property. 
13. The Court, having determined that the right of first 
refusal survived the Decree and deed issued thereunder (D.8), finds 
that the claims of each of Plaintiff must be considered. 
14. As early as October 12, 1985, Salli Smith West gave 
written notice that she was interested in selling her one-third 
share in the subject-matter property. On September 4, 1986, 
Charles L. Appleby, Jr. went to Santa Fe, New Mexico, and at that 
time Salli Smith West modified and extended a July 23, 1986, Option 
to Purchase, marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17 (hereafter P.17), 
by drafting the Option to Purchase dated September 4, 1986, 
received into evidence and marked as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 11 
(hereafter D.ll). By this Option (D.ll), Ken Anderson and Charles 
L. Appleby Jr. took an option to purchase the interest of Salli 
Smith West in and to the subject-matter property. 
15. By August of 1981, Salli Smith West had relocated 
in New Mexico, and the monthly income generated by the lease 
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agreement on the subject-matter property was modest in light of the 
option to purchase the property executed in September of 1986 by 
Anderson and Appleby (D.ll). 
16. Anderson and Appleby were aware of the right of 
first refusal, and Salli Smith West represented to them that she 
would personally take care of that factual matter with those 
holding or claiming the right. 
17. On or about September 26, 1986, the Salli Smith West 
gave sufficient notice to Jesse E. Smith, by telephone, of the 
offer of Appleby and Anderson to purchase her interest in the 
subject-matter property. This telephone call was made to Jesse E. 
Smith while he was at work and is substantiated by the telephone 
records received into evidence as Defendants1 Exhibit No. 13. 
Though Mr. Smith indicated that he could not be reached by tele-
phone at his place of employment, the Court, en camera and with 
counsel present, made a call to the number indicated on the 
telephone records and was able to reach Mr. Smith's assistant, who 
indicated that Mr. Smith was out of town, but otherwise could have 
been telephonically contacted. 
18. Salli Smith West disclosed the nature of the offer 
to Jesse E. Smith, and Mr. Smith said that he had no desire to 
individually meet the offer of Anderson and Appleby. The Court 
finds, based upon the credibility of the testimony of Salli Smith, 
that during this telephone conversation Jesse E. Smith further 
assured Salli Smith West that he would send he.r a letter to the 
effect that he would not exercise his first right of refusal. 
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19. Approximately three days subsequent to said tele-
phone call, Jesse E. Smith sent a letter dated September 29, 1986, 
marked and received into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 4 
(hereafter P.4), to Salli Smith West indicating that upon receipt 
of a copy of Anderson and Appleby's offer to purchase the property 
he would give her "a letter signed by Beth, Gen, and myself 
releasing you from our option of first right of refusal." 
20. Salli Smith West relied on the oral and written 
representations of Jesse E. Smith in allowing Anderson and Appleby 
to exercise their option to purchase her interest in the subject-
matter property. Considering that Salli Smith West was dealing 
primarily with family members, her reliance on Jesse E. Smith's 
oral and written representations was reasonable. 
21. On or about October 2, 1986, Salli Smith West, 
together with Anderson and Appleby, completed the closing of the 
real estate option before Terra Title Company in St. George, Utah, 
as is represented by Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 7. 
22. Salli Smith West, in a letter dated October 6, 1986, 
which is marked and received into evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
No. 5, complied with the terms set forth in the Jesse E. Smith's 
letter of September 29, 1986 (P.4). 
23. Jesse E. Smith knew, or had reason to know, that 
Salli Smith West would rely on his representations orally made on 
September 26, 1986, also made in writing on September 29, 1986 
(P.4). However, after Salli Smith West gave Jesse E. Smith the 
information requested of her, Jesse E. Smith did not provide the 
ooo? 
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promised letter to Salli Smith West, contrary to both his oral and 
written representations. 
24. By letter dated Octobe 13, 1986, marked and 
received into evidence as Plaintiffs1 Exhibit No. 6, Jesse E. Smith 
avoided sending the promised letter waiving the right of first 
refusal and instead stalled the sending of that letter by request-
ing documents which the Court finds irrelevant to the right of 
first refusal as contained in the Stipulation (P.l). 
25. By reason of Jesse E. Smith's oral and written 
representations, he gave up any claim he may have had under his 
right of first refusal at that time, and is now estopped from 
asserting the same both by the principles of equitable and promis-
sory estoppel. 
26. Salli Smith West, in reliance on the representations 
made by Jesse E. Smith, consummated the sale and put herself in a 
position of jeopardy by his subsequent conduct, which conduct 
breached and reneged on the promises made both orally and in 
writing to her. 
27 o The July 23, 1986, option (P. 17) need not have been 
communicated to the Plaintiffs because the same was not accepted 
in its form by Salli Smith West, and, as a result, there was no 
need, by reason of the original Stipulation (P.l), to communicate 
that offer to her other co-tenants. As Judge Greenwood stated in 
the G.G.A. case: 
A right of first refusal to purchase 
property is different from an option in that 
a right of first refusal is not binding unless 
the offeror decides to sell the property. 
[G.G.A. v. Laventis, supra.] 
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28. The Court specifically finds that Salli Smith West 
did not decide to sell the property under the July 23, 1986, 
option. 
29. Prior to trial, Genevieve A. Smith created a Nevada 
corporation, to-wit: Silver Sands Inc., and conveyed her interest 
in the subject-matter property to said corporation by warranty deed 
on or about May 17, 1988. 
30. In making this conveyance, Genevieve A. Smith ceased 
to be a co-tenant in and to the property. Furthermore, in making 
said conveyance, she did not abide by the terms of the right of 
first refusal because she felt it was "her corporation11 and that 
the right of first refusal did not apply. 
31. The right of first refusal belonged to co-tenants 
as specified in the Stipulation (P.l) and was meant to be a family 
right to entitle the grantees under the Decree (D.8) to hold the 
property as part of the family in the event any one of them 
intended to sell. 
32. At the time of trial, Genevieve A. Smith was no 
longer a co-tenant, and she did not have the right to claim a 
benefit to the right of first refusal as she lost the status or 
standing as an individual to pursue that right. 
33. A corporation is a separate legal entity. The fact 
that Genevieve A. Smith may be the sole stockholder in the corpora-
tion does not alter the fact that it is a different legal entity, 
and Genevieve A. Smith is no longer a co-tenant. As a result, the 
Court holds against Genevieve A. Smith on her claim, and finds she 
r\rsr\*>fl n 
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had no standing to assert the same at the time of trial. 
34. Beth M. Smith was not a party to the Stipulation 
(P.l), and cannot claim any rights under it. Furthermore, the 
position of Beth M. Smith cannot be ascertained, by reason of her 
failure to offer any testimony or evidence at trial and by reason 
of the fact that the complaint stands unverified in the file. 
35. Upon being sued, Anderson and Appleby, by reason of 
the Warranty Deed marked and received into evidence as Defendants' 
Exhibit No. 1, requested defense of their title from Salli Smith 
West. 
36. As the Court has ruled for the Defendants Anderson 
and Appleby, affirming their title to Salli Smith West's former 
interest in the subject-matter property, the cross-claim of 
Anderson and Appleby for indemnification for their attorney!s fees 
in defending the title as received under the Warranty Deed (D.l) 
from Salli Smith West should, likewise, be denied and dismissed. 
37. Defendants1 attorney, Michael D. Hughes, offered 
testimony, which testimony is uncontroverted, that the attorney's 
fees in defending this matter were $6,500.00 through the date of 
trial, and Hughes was thereafter instructed by the Court to prepare 
further pleadings in conformity to this Courtfs memorandum deci-
sion. 
38. Costs in defending the suit, however, should be 
awarded to the prevailing Defendants Anderson and Appleby. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff Beth M. Smith has no standing to bring the 
not. 
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instant cause of action against Defendants in that she was not a 
signor to the original Stipulation, and she filed no affidavits nor 
offered no testimony in support of her complaint. As a result 
thereof, Beth M. Smithfs complaint as against all Defendants should 
be dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendant and Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West 
relied, to her detriment, on the oral and written representations 
of Plaintiff Jesse M. Smith in conveying the property to Anderson 
and Appleby. As a result thereof, Jesse M. Smith is estopped, by 
the principles of promissory and equitable estoppal, from asserting 
any claim to exercise his right of first refusal which he agreed 
to waive and which agreement to waiver was relied on by Salli Smith 
West. 
3. The right of first refusal was held by co-tenants 
who were members of the family of Elias Penn Smith; and, upon 
termination of Genevieve A. Smith's co-tenancy, the right of first 
refusal held by Genevieve A. Smith was also terminated. 
4. The grantee corporation of Plaintiff Genevieve A. 
Smith is a different legal entity than the individual, and 
Genevieve A. Smith had no standing to bring suit based upon the 
right of first refusal where she had, prior to trial, conveyed her 
interest in and to the subject-matter property to a Nevada corpora-
tion. 
5. Plaintiffs1 complaint should be dismissed with 
prejudice with costs to Defendants. 
6. Having prevailed on their claim for a valid title, 
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Defendants Anderson and Appleby are not entitled to reimbursement 
of attorney's fees despite the issuance of a Warranty Deed to them 
by Salli Smith West and despite her representations that she would 
take care of the right of first refusal. 
7. A judgment in accordance with the foregoing findings 
of fact and conclusions of law should be ent€>red and formally 
executed by the Court. 
DATED this S> day of J^THJ^ry, 1990. 
-AN-
DEAN E. CONDER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was 
placed in the United States mail at St. George, Utah, with first-
ly 
class postage thereon fully prepaid on the *7 ^ day of Jla^uaryT/ 
1990, addressed as follows: 
Mr. James L. Shumate 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Ms. Salli Smith West 
546 Onate Place 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 
WM/J\. 
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SALLI SMITH WEST, 
Cross-Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-1058 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for trial on the 
21st day of April, 1989, without a jury, and Plaintiffs being 
represented by and through their attorney of record James L. 
Shumate, and Defendants and Cross-Claimants Ken Anderson and 
Charles L. Appleby, Jr. being present and represented by their 
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attorney of record Michael D. Hughes, and Defendant and Cross-
Defendant Salli Smith West appearing pro se, and the Court having 
heard the testimony of the witnesses and having received the 
evidentiary support for both Plaintiffs1 unverified complaint and 
the defenses proposed by Defendants, Cross-Claimants, and Cross-
Defendants, and the matter having been briefly argued and supple-
mented by written memoranda, now, therefore, the Court having 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, hereby enters 
judgment as follows, to-wit: 
1. Plaintiffs1 complaint against Defendants is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants Anderson and Appleby's cross-claim 
against Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. Defendants Anderson and Appleby are entitled to 
costs as against Plaintiffs. 
4. Title to Cross-Defendant Salli Smith West's property 
is hereby vested, pursuant to the Warranty Deed of October 2, 1986, 
recorded in the Office of the Washington County Recorder as Entry 
No. 303129, at Book 428, Pages 870-871, in the names of Defendants 
and Cross-Claimants Kenneth R. Anderson and Charles L. Appleby, 
Jr. ; and their interest is free and clear of any right of first 
refusal insofar as they are not signatories to the original 
Stipulation and Petition for Distribution. The* property described 
in said Warranty Deed, and which is the subject matter of this 
lawsuit, is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached 
ooo 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
DATED t h i s & d a y o f Ersts^nber , 19'8r9 
^L. 
DEAN E . CONDER 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing JUDGMENT was placed in the United States 
mail at St. George, Utah, with first-class postage thereon fully 
prepaid on the "~7^ day of^JJacombor/, "198-9, addressed as follows: 
Mr. James L. Shumate 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Ms. Salli Smith West 
546 Onate Place 
Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 
EXHIBIT "A" 
BEGINNING at a point in middle of the channel of Virgin River located 
directly South frcm a point 15.4 chains East of Northwest Corner of 
the Northeast it Southeast k Section 26, Township 41 Southf Range 13 
West, Salt Lake Meridiam and running thence North 9.4 chains, more or 
less to a point 30 feet South of a line seperating the Southeast k and 
the Northeast h of said Section 26; thence South 87° East 9.7 chains, 
more or less; thence South 23°45' West 5.4 chains; thence South 68° 
East 24.50 chains, more or less, to the middle of Virgin River, to 
a point, which is 14 chains West and 15.chains South frem the Northeast 
Corner of the Southwest k Sections 25; thence follow downstream the 
middle of the River to the point of beginning. ALSO Beginning at 
a point 10 Chains South of the Northwest corner of the Soutliwest k 
Southwest quarter Section 25, Township 41 South, Range 13, West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian and running thence East 30 chains thence Northerly 
30 Chains, more or less to the point of intersection of the middle 
of the channel of the Virgin River with the line seperating the Southwest 
\ and Northwest k of Section 25, then follow downstream the middle 
of the River to a point where said river intersects the Ecisterly boundary 
line of Highway U-17; thence South 21°04' West 15 Chains, more or 
less to the South boundary line of Northeast k Southeast k Section 26; 
thence East 19 Chains, more or less to the Southeast corner of the 
Northeast k Southeast ^; thence South 10 Chains to BEGINNING. 
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